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Abstract 
 
 
The paper addresses two core questions: do recommendations have an impact on the 
allocation of flows in the asset class? Above all, are we facing in this asset class 
major problems of asymmetries of information? In order to answer these questions, 
we used untapped and rich datasets. We constructed a unique database covering the 
period 1997-2006 for all the bond recommendations by the major Wall Street and 
City investment banks that dominate the emerging bond markets. The most important 
and relevant results are as follows. First, 90% of the underwriters recommend, at the 
announcement date of the issue, to buy or to maintain in their portfolio the bonds 
issued by the countries where they are acting as lead managers. Second, there is an 
additional bias, investment banks’ recommendations depend also on the relative size 
of the secondary bond market. In fact, there is a phenomenon that we call “too big to 
underwrite” meaning that investment banks do not send negative signals to investors 
of countries that, given their size, are considered important for their business. Finally, 
by using a simple cross-section analysis, we found that the impact of investment 
banks’ recommendations on capital flows is more significant and more predictable 
than some macroeconomic variables such as interest rates, economic growth and 
inflation.       
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the beginning of the XXIst century, emerging markets have reached a kind 
of nirvana. The global search for higher returns led to record inflows of liquidity into 
dedicated emerging markets’ bond and equity funds, especially in 2005 and 2006. In 
2005, emerging market equity funds absorbed more than USD 20 bn on net inflows, five 
times more than the previous year and beating the record of 2003, according to data from 
Emerging Portfolio Fund Research, a US company that tracks fund flows around the 
world. Emerging bond markets also soared, breaking the previous record of inflows as 
more than USD 10 bn flew to these funds in 2005 against a meager USD 3 bn in 2004. 
The year 2006 saw an even more impressive turn of events: in January, global net inflows 
into emerging markets equities topped more than USD 11 bn, that is more than half of 
last year’s total in a single month.  In the first quarter alone of 2006, inflows exceeded 
those received during the whole of 2005. 
 
The search for yield explains much of this story. Historically low interest rates in 
developed countries and soaring global liquidity, combined with structural 
macroeconomic improvements in the emerging markets asset class, led to an impressive 
search for yield that benefited emerging markets. This environment has been particularly 
favorable for investment banks with huge amounts of money pouring into the asset class, 
fees burgeoning and massive deals in the pipeline. The multilateral officials were 
probably the only unhappy people in the crowd, fearing that their institutions could be 
relegated to the trash heap of history. In Wall Street and the City, while yield-hungry 
buyers were casting the net wider in the hunt for returns, analysts and investment bankers 
were opening champagne.  
 
However, this emerging market boom is not new. During the late nineteenth 
century, Latin American countries, for example, already experienced a massive foreign 
investment boom. A major part of the inflows took the form of sovereign debt, the bonds 
being traded in European financial centers. By that time, the market value of emerging 
market debt traded in London was impressive: at the turn of the XXth century, by 1905, 
its value was equivalent to 12% of world GDP. One century later, in 1999, the total 
volume of emerging debt market traded was however a meager 2,7% of world GDP. The 
recent allure of emerging markets has seen debt trading value jump to USD 5 500 bn in 
2005 (roughly 12% of world GDP), which is simply restoring the position already 
reached 100 years ago. 
 
Therefore, even if in nominal terms we are witnessing an explosion of bond flows 
towards emerging markets, this pales in comparison to the previous globalization era, in 
relation to the size of the world’s economies. Not only was the previous era of global 
finance much more open in terms of total capital flows but emerging markets were also 
very present within London asset managers and bank portfolios. The largest bondholder 
of long-term cross border investments at the turn of the XXth Century was the United 
Kingdom, accounting for nearly half of all cross-border investments in the early XXth 
Century. At the time, about 30% of its investments were in government debt, 40% in 
railways, 10% in mining, and 5% in utilities. According to estimates from Mauro et al 
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(Mauro et al., 2002), by 1905, the market value of emerging markets bonds traded in 
London reached 25% of all government bonds traded in the City! By comparison, in 
recent years, US institutional investors have had barely 10% of their portfolios invested 
in foreign securities, with a meagre fraction of that capital devoted to emerging markets. 
 
The asymmetries of information were also impressive by that time. In both 
periods of finance globalization news about wars or episodes of politically-motivated 
violence have been a significant and robust determinant of spreads. One difference is that 
in the first era, country-specific fundamentals account for a greater share of variation in 
spreads than they do today (Mauro, Sussman, and Yafeh, 2006). Another is that 
information asymmetries tend to be lower today than in the previous era, as also reflected 
by risk premiums. Although it is now hard to imagine a story such as that of Gregor 
McGregor, a Scottish trader and adventurer who “invented” a country, Poyais, and 
subsequently paper traded on that country in London during the 1820s, asymmetries of 
information still remain a concern today. Poyais was a fictious state that nevertheless 
borrowed on the London market in 1822. When investors discovered the fraud one year 
later and ceased to traded the worthless papers it ended in one of the first big series of 
Latin defaults. By the mid XIXth Century, as illustrated by the fictitious Poyais country, 
which managed to borrow on the same terms as legitimate states such as Chile, Colombia 
or Peru, the ability to distinguish between Latin American countries was scarce.  
 
Today a repeat of this story is impossible: the levels of information are higher, the 
density and complexity of players is also greater. However asymmetries of information 
remain. One, in particular, which concerns mostly developed economies and equity 
markets is related to the autonomy of financial research. Most of the studies underline the 
bias with which the industry is plagued. However the empirical evidence on emerging 
markets is pretty scarce. If some studies have been conducted on emerging equity 
analysts, hardly any exist on emerging bond markets. Our study provides a first attempt 
to fill this gap. It addresses two core questions: are broker recommendations useful in 
emerging bond markets? In other terms do buy or sell recommendations have an impact 
on the allocation of flows in the asset class? Above all are we facing in this asset class 
similar problems of asymmetries of information? Are brokers’ recommendations biased 
towards positive outlooks? 
 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section two, we provide a 
review of the literature. In Section three, we describe the datasets we used, among them a 
unique and untapped dataset of all brokers’ recommendations between 1997 to 2006 for 
Latin American emerging markets. In the fourth section, we study the relationship 
between investment banks’ recommendations and some aspects related to the business of 
these banks (in particular sell-side business). This section gives some preliminary results 
in order to understand whether banks’ advice to investors is biased. For that we analyzed 
firstly underwriters’ recommendations and secondly the relationship between the size of 
emerging markets and recommendations. Section five analyzes the impact of broker 
recommendations on private capital flows towards emerging markets, matching the afore-
mentioned database with another one on private portfolio flows. Lastly in the sixth 
 5
section we conclude by giving the most important results of this paper and we open the 
door to future research by employing the newly constructed database. 
 
 
2. Overview of the literature 
 
One of the most important factors affecting the efficiency of capital markets is the 
problem of asymmetry information between financial actors. More precisely, in an Initial 
Public Offering (IPO), an information advantage can arise concerning “fundamentals” of 
the security for the agent in charge of the underwriting (the bank) over the buyer of the 
security (the investor). This advantage allows underwriters, through reports made by 
market analysts, to send to investors recommendations biased towards increasing 
underwriters’ profits, given that part of the payment made by the issuer to the underwriter 
depends on the “success” of the issue in the primary market.  
 
Empirical literature has mainly investigated these stock market issues in relation 
to OECD countries. Womack (1996), for example, studied the impact that a 
recommendation may have on the price of a share issued in the American market by 
analyzing the excess return in the short and medium-term following a buy or sell 
recommendation made by analysts of the major brokerage firms. More recently, Jackson 
(2005) instances the Australian equity market to demonstrate that analysts are confronted 
by a trade-off between sending true signals to the market (thereby building up one’s 
reputation) and sending optimistic recommendations to obtain the short-term benefit of 
higher commissions. 
 
Studies of the relation between underwriters and recommendations are scarcer, 
and the results suggest there is a conflict of interest between different sides of an 
investment bank department, such as between the side charged with issuing securities and 
the research department. Analyzing the US equity market, Womack and Michaely (1999) 
found for example that ‘stocks that underwriter analysts recommend perform more poorly 
than “buy” recommendations by unaffiliated brokers prior to, at the time of, and 
subsequent to the recommendation date’, which suggests that recommendations by 
underwriter-analysts are biased. 
 
From a theoretical point of view, the research literature concerning this topic is 
rich and useful. Myers and Majluf (1984) studied an asymmetric information problem 
involving managers of a firm about to issue stock to raise cash and potential investors. In 
the same vein, Stein (1989) modelled a non-cooperative game between managers and 
rational investors that yielded the short-term behaviour of equity prices following 
earnings manipulations by the managers. More relevant to our research, Benabou and 
Laroque (1992) studied the manipulation of prices by the effect of private and pre-
announcements on prices. However, they noted that under some conditions investors can 
resolve this problem in the long run by reassessing the credibility of the individuals 
offering private information (the research analysts).  
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The purpose of our study is to focus on emerging markets that have not yet been 
analyzed from this angle. More precisely we intend to analyze this asymmetric 
information problem in relation to the bonds issued by Latin American governments 
through international banks (the underwriters) in the US and European capital markets. 
Our point of departure is Santiso (2003), which analyzes the political economy of Latin 
American emerging markets, focusing the attention on actors and institutions.  
 
Research analysts play a centre role in financial markets. Together with fund 
managers they are at the heart of the confidence game (Santiso, 2003). Their 
recommendations influence the price of a company’s stock or a sovereign bond. They 
live in a forward-looking world where anticipation and prediction (of rises or falls) is the 
key to reaching a financial nirvana measured in extra bonuses. Their cognitive regime is 
imbedded in short-term horizons, research and trade priorities and therefore potential 
conflicts of interest. 
 
These research analysts study companies and sovereigns in emerging markets and 
make buy and sell recommendations on the securities of the firms they cover. They are 
usually specialized in a particular industry, sector or, for emerging markets, particular 
countries and areas, Latin America being in itself an asset class. Whether or not a 
company or country is covered by research analysts is a central issue. Without significant 
coverage by the industry, the company or country simply does not exist in the financial 
world 3. Obviously being positively or negatively covered also matters as the analysts’ 
outputs and opinions about a firm or a country are precious signals to which investors 
react. As underlined by academics, investors react to the information contained in 
analysts’ earnings forecasts, stock recommendations and also target prices4.  
 
One major concern during the 1990s has been both their influence and 
independence. Analysts belong to institutions, for example investment banks, that are not 
homogeneous entities. Within each institution, each division and each department pursues 
certain goals and strategies that are linked with the firm, but that may conflict with one 
another. Investment banks for example have at least three identified sources of income 
that are basically brokerage services; (i) corporate finance activities, issuance of 
securities; (ii) merger and acquisitions advisory services; and (iii) proprietary trading. 
These three sources of income may create conflicts of interest within the firm, between 
departments and divisions, but also outside the firm with its potential or current clients. A 
frequent and observable conflict of interest occurs between investment banking and 
brokerage activities. The corporate division of a bank is responsible for the issuance of an 
                                                 
3 The consequence of this is that companies or countries have to fight to be included in indexes or simply to be covered by analysts. 
This means for a company, for example, to present coherent products and corporate strategies easily and clearly indentifiable by stock 
market analysts. As underlined by Ezra Zuckerman, « a firm that participates in a given industry but does not draw attention from 
industry socialists can be described as suffering from coverage » and tend to contribute to diversifying strategies by corporate 
managers in order that their stock could be more easily understood by financial analysts. See Ezra Zuckerman, « Focusing the 
corporate product: securities analysts and de-diversification », Administrative Science Quarterly, n° 45, 2000, pp. 591-619. 
4 See Alon Brav and Reuven Lehavy, « An empirical analysis of analysts’ target prices: short term informativeness and long term 
dynamics », Duke University and University of California at Berkeley, May 2001 (unpublished) ; Mark Bradshaw, « How do analysts 
use their forecasts ? », Harvard Business School Working Paper, 2000 (unpublished). 
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initial public offering (IPO) or a merger and acquisition for a client. The brokerage house 
of the firm, through its equity department, is responsible for covering the stock with a 
clear objective of delivering timely, unbiased and high quality information to clients that 
are investors. Clearly the objectives of the corporate division can clash with those of the 
equity research department. 
 
In this case, analysts will do their best to deliver the most valuable and 
independent opinion. For this they use a narrow range of terms to qualify their 
recommendations – buy, strong buy, hold, neutral, over-perform or under-perform. 
However, one of the paradoxes underlined by the US Securities Exchange Commission in 
2001, is that these analyses are rarely « sell » recommendations: in the year 2000, for 
example, less than 1% of all Wall Street brokerage house analysts’ recommendations 
were « sell » or « strong sell » recommendations. In fact all analysts at investment banks 
tread a thin line and are caught in potential conflicts of interest. On the one hand, 
investors, their major clients, want « sell-side firms » to give honest opinions and be 
successful over time. On the other hand, an analyst’s objectivity and independence can be 
threatened by several potential conflicts of interest, most of them stemming from the 
blurring of the lines between research and investment banking 5.  
 
Several factors can shape the investment recommendation as stressed by the US 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC): the analyst’s firm may be underwriting the 
offering of a company covered by the analysts ; client companies will prefer positive 
research reports therefore negative ones could damage the investment firm’s efforts to 
build long term and lucrative client relationships with a corporate or a sovereign; analyst 
compensation and bonuses can be linked to the number of deals done; and last but not 
least, the broker, the analyst or any other employee in the firm may own interests in the 
company covered. A US SEC Staff analysis released in 2001 of nine Wall Street firms 
found the following: seven of them reported that « investment banking had input into 
analysts’ bonuses and the analyst hiring process »; although there is no formal 
supervision of analysts by investment banking « it is well understood by all these analysts 
that they were not permitted to issue negative opinions about investment banking 
clients »; in a total of 308 out of 317 IPOs examined, the firm that underwrote the 
security also provided research coverage 6; and finally «about one quarter of the analysts 
inspected own securities in companies they cover ». The interest of US regulators in 
analysts’ conflicts of interests prompted the industries associations to provide answers. 
The Securities Industry Association, for example, issued in 2001 a « best practices for 
                                                 
5 As underlined by Laura Unger, acting chair of the US Securities & Exchange Commission, « The blurring can be seen in a number 
of ways. First an analyst’s salary and bonus may be linked to the profitability of the firm’s investment banking business, motivating 
analysts to attract and retain investment banking clients for the firm. Second, at some firms, analysts are accountable to investment 
banking for their ratings. Third, analysts sometimes own apiece of the company they analyze, mostly through pre-IPO share 
acquisitions », Laura Unger, « Testimony concerning conflicts of interest faced by brokerage firms and their research analysts », 
Testimony before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored 
Enterprises, Committee on Financial Services, July 31 2001, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/073101tslu.htm and 
http://www.house.gov/financialservices/080201lu.pdf 
6 The impact of investment banking relationships on analysts’ stocks recommendations in the context of initial public offerings (IPO) 
has been also analyzed by Roni Michaely and Kenk Womack, « Conflict of interest and the credibility of underwriter analyst 
recommendations, » Review of Financial Studies, 12, 1999, pp. 653-686. 
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research » in order to consolidate the « integrity of research » recommending for example 
that research should not report to investment banking and that analysts should not be 
directly linked to specific investment banking transactions 7. At the same time, firms 
started reviewing their internal procedures to manage conflicts in a response to increasing 
pressure from former clients. Several of them, from Credit Suisse First Boston to Merrill 
Lynch, started in 2001 to adopt policies prohibiting analysts to own securities in 
companies they covered 8. 
 
Analysts do not only face a myriad of conflicts of interest. Most worrying is the 
predictive imperative they face. Here the paradox is that, in spite of academic studies 
pointing to lack of efficiency, research departments of brokerage houses continue to 
spend large amounts of money on research analysis. They are not, however, totally wrong 
in doing so. It is true that the financial industry during the 1990s experienced a dramatic 
change with the boom of the investment banking business. This trend spreads the belief 
that analysts became increasingly focused on attracting clients rather on writing 
independent reports. The answer is partly true if we take into account that « sell » or 
« strong sell » recommendations almost disappeared. However, some academic research 
is helpful to nuance this perception.  
 
Two recent academic studies pointed to this change and underlined that, during 
the period of 1986-1996 (a time with less influence from investment banking) 9, sell-side 
recommendations had significant value, and the same also applies for the period 1996-
2000. In fact, according to a study based on First Call data recording 160 000 real-time 
recommendations made by 299 brokerage houses 10, most highly rated stocks 
outperformed the less favourable ones during all the period 1996-2000 and this in every 
year but one : in 2000, the trends were very different and the reverse is true. During this 
period, analysts became increasingly positive with the percentage of « buy/strong buy » 
recommendations jumping from 65% to more than 70% over the period analyzed. Above 
all, this research underlines a singular behaviour for 2000, reversing the one prevailing 
during the previous years. The most highly recommended stocks in 2000 returned 31.2 % 
less than the market, on average, while the least favourably recommended stocks gained 
almost 49 % more than the market. This data also confirms the very few « sell/strong sell 
recommendations » found by previous studies : the percentage of negative 
recommendations on stock fell from 3,4% in 1996 to a mere 1,8% in 2000, meaning that 
nearly to negative opinion is being issued by analysts. 
 
                                                 
7 See Securities Industry Association, Best practices for research, New York and Washington, SIA, 2001. 
8 See « Credit Suisse limits holdings of its analysts », Wall Street Journal, July 25 2001, at C14 ; « Merrill alters a policy on 
analysts », Wall Street Journal, July 11 2001, at C2. 
9 See Brad Barber, Reuven Lehavy, Maureen McNichols and Brett Trueman, « Can investors profit from the prophets ? Security 
analyst recommendations and stock returns », The Journal of Finance, vol. 56, n° 2, April 2001, pp. 531-563. 
10 See Brad Barber, Reuven Lehavy, Maureen McNichols and Brett Trueman, « Prophets and losses: reassessing the returns to 
analysts’ stock recommendations », Stanford University, Graduate School of Business Research Paper Series, n° 1692, May 2001 
(unpublished). 
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Another line of research has being trying to foresee if analyst recommendations 
tend to have an impact. Here again, the bulk of the research has been heavily 
concentrated in developed countries. As for the previous questioning, there has been 
fewer, not to say no analysis conducted on emerging markets. Some papers focused for 
example on trading activities on security analyst recommendations, finding that both 
large and small traders tend to react to these recommendations (Mikhail, Walther, and 
Willis, 2005). Prior work has also documented that market reaction to upgrades is less 
pronounced than the market reaction to downgrades by analysts (see Asquith, Mikhail, 
and Au, 2005; Hirst, Koonce, and Simko, 1995; Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee, 2004; 
Womack, 1996). All of this research has been focused on developing countries. 
 
Not all analysts and brokerage houses are equals. Investment banks and securities 
houses differ in their strategies, structures and performances. Individual analysts differ 
also according to their « performance », some being more appreciated than others for 
their recommendations. In general, buy recommendations of the largest brokerage houses 
tend to outperform those of the smallest by about 3% annually on a market-adjusted 
basis11. Because of their closer ties with corporate management or sovereign officials, 
their greater resources to support research and their larger number of analysts, bigger 
investment firms tend to outperform their smaller counterparts. The analyst forecast 
accuracy tends to increase with the size of the investment boutique to which the research 
analyst belongs, not only because the biggest investment houses tend to hire the best 
analysts but also because they offer them greater resources to carry out their research 
(databases, bloombergs, etc.). You can be the best analyst and be off the map simply 
because you do not belong to one of the top institutions. You can also be the best analyst 
but remain unknown because your research is not referenced in the media, newspapers or 
research providers like Bloomberg, Reuters, Investext or Multext). Lastly, depending on 
the type of firm you are working for, your track record can be better or worse, depending 
whether you are in the sell side industry or in the buy side (Brown, Hugon and Luo, 
2006). 
  
In spite of the amount of literature on broker recommendations, analysts’ bias, and 
fund managers’ relations, very little has been written on emerging markets. Among the 
rare research devoted to emerging markets (Santiso, 2003), some papers underline that 
there is strong evidence that foreign financial analysts outperform local analysts in these 
markets, as they tend to produce more timely and more accurate forecasts (Bacmann and 
Bolliger, 2001; Seasholes, 2000) 12. In a recent paper Seasholes investigated information 
asymmetries in emerging stock markets and found that there was little evidence that 
locals were better informed than foreigners and there is evidence that foreign investors 
                                                 
11 See Brad Barber, Reuven Lehavy and Brett Trueman, « Are all brokerage houses created equal ? Testing for systematic differences 
in the performance of brokerage house stock recommendations », University of California at Davis and University of California at 
Berkeley, March 2000 (unpublished). This research shows also that surprisingly smaller brokers tend to  make twice as much « sell » 
recommendations than the biggest investment boutiques (14% of sell/strong sell against 6% for the big brokers houses during the 
period studied 1986-1998). The smallest brokers tend also to have superior « sell » recommendations than their bigger competitors, 
this may be linked to the fact the big broker houses have stronger interests and incentives for preserving existing or potential client 
relationships). 
12 Bolliger finds however that local houses in Europe have an advantage over foreign ones (Bolliger, 2004), sharing the same kind of 
results as other studies on OECD countries (Orpurt, 2004). 
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can outperform locals when trading specific stocks (Seasholes, 2004). Other studies, 
using a sample of 32 countries, among them some emerging ones, tend to find on the 
contrary a local advantage for the period 2001-2003 and in particular US investors tend to 
underweight a country’s stocks more in their portfolio if that country has a higher analyst 
local advantage (i.e. countries where earnings are smoothed more and less information is 
disclosed by firms) (Bae, Stulz and Tan, 2005).  
 
During the 90s, the emerging equity markets industry boomed, with the number of 
stocks covered rising from 150 to nearly 500 between 1993 and 2000, according to some 
estimates (Bacmann and Bolliger, 2001). The number of brokers covering emerging 
stocks also increased (from 66 to 170) as well as the number of analysts (from around 
260 to more than 1650 for the same period). The average number of analysts employed 
by foreign brokerage houses amounted to 8 while the average was 5.5 for local ones. 
Local analysts tended however to be more active, producing forecasts every 76 days 
(while their foreign peer produced every 71 days) and changing their firm forecasts on 
average 1.5 times per firm each year (against 1.16). As shown also by another study, the 
variation of analysts per country varies a lot: while South Africa has only 3 firms and 
Brazil has 23, the former had 126 analysts covering stocks (85 of them foreign) and the 
latter only 28 (11 of them foreign) (Bae, Stulz, and Tan, 2005). 
  
Other micro-focused studies analyzed individual investor behaviour (for example 
the 90 500 actively investing individuals within the People’s Republic of China by the 
beginning of the 2000s, Feng and Seasholes, 2003) and mutual funds investment 
strategies in emerging markets (Schmukler et al., 2004) or the extent and accuracy of 
analyst activity across 47 countries (15 of them emerging markets) (Chang, Khanna, 
Palepu, 2000).  
  
All in all, studies focused on emerging markets analysts, brokers and investors 
tend to be scarce. When they exist, they are concentrated on equity markets. None as far 
as we know investigated the confidence game within emerging bond markets. This is in 
fact quite surprising when compared to the density of studies issued on financial analysts 
over the past years. Since 1992 no less than 250 papers related to financial analysts have 
been published in the nine major research journals, one of the most complete reviews of 
the literature (Ramnath, Rock, and Shane, 2006). 
 
Our study proposes to cover this gap. We used untapped and rich datasets, 
entirely built on their own, as explained in the following section. We wanted first to 
determine whether bond analyst recommendations are biased and depend first on the 
underwriting mandate and second on the size of a specific country’s bond market. The 
second objective of the paper was to study the impact of investment banks’ 
recommendations on fund flows. In other terms whether these analyses are relevant or 
useful to understand capital flows towards emerging economies. For that we constructed 
a unique database covering the period 1997-2006 for all the bond recommendations by 
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the major Wall Street and City brokerage firms dominating the emerging bond markets, 
and more precisely the Latin American segment where we focused our attention, the 
region being the most active in bond markets.  
  
 
3. Description of the data 
 
In this section we present the source and the relevance of the data used for this 
paper. The data could be divided into three different types. Firstly, we have the 
information provided by brokerage houses to investors about the sentiment vis-à-vis an 
emerging economy. Secondly, we employ data related to the structure of the Latin 
American Bond Market. More precisely, we use issues, size of each country in the market 
and credit risk given by the market to emerging countries. Finally, we have taken some 
macroeconomic variables of Latin American economies such as capital flows, economic 
activity, interest rates, exchanges rates and inflation rates.  
 
The most important and innovative aspect of our paper is the construction of a 
new untapped database containing the recommendations given by the major investment 
banks of the Latin American bond markets. Indeed, this is the first publication that 
studies the impact that investment banks’ recommendations may have on Latin American 
Capital Markets. By using simple statistical analyses we give a primer result of the 
impact of research publications on emerging capital markets. 
 
For this purpose we have used the publications produced by the major investment 
banks operating in emerging markets. In their monthly or quarterly publications they 
published the recommendation for each emerging country, giving their recommendations 
to the clients, namely the “buy side” industry of asset managers, mutual funds, hedge 
funds, pension funds, etc. An interesting point is that these publications are only available 
for clients and are not therefore public information. Indeed, they represent a direct and 
strict link between financial intermediaries and investors. We managed to build the 
database for 10 brokers, all of them dominant players in emerging bond markets as 
underwriters. All of them are from developed countries’ brokerage houses, which are in 
fact the market makers: ABN AMRO, Barclays Capital, Citibank, Credit Suisse First 
Boston (now Credit Suisse), Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Lehman 
Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley. 
 
The period of the recommendations that we have used goes from July 1997 to 
March 200613 and the number of recommendations is over 3,300 14. As shown in table 1, 
we have taken 11 emerging countries for this research. Indeed they are the Latin 
American countries that are studied in these publications and that represent more than 
90% of the GDP of the region. They also concentrated over the period the major bond 
issuers within the emerging market asset class. With regard to investment banks, our 
                                                 
13 In fact, for the period July 1997 - December 1999 we only have information from Citibank.  
14 Most of these publications are realized on a monthly basis (see Annex 1). In order to compare the recommendations provided by 
investment banks, we have defined a specific month From the 20 of each month (not included) to the 20 of the next month (included). 
For example July is from 21 June until 20 July.   
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database is constructed from 10 investment banks which represent more than 80% of the 
investment banks present in the Latin American sovereign IPOs.   
 
The frequency of these publications is in most cases monthly, and the 
recommendations that we have used are those given to sovereign external debt. In order 
to compare the view of each bank towards Latin American countries at the same time, we 
have classified three types of recommendations, which are Overweight (that takes the 
value of 1), Neutral (0) and Underweight (-1), assimilated to the cases of buying, 
maintaining and selling with respect to an index (e.g. EMBI+ calculated by JPMorgan). 
This means that given portfolio restrictions, a buying recommendation must be 
compensated by a selling advice, implying that investment banks are constrained to 
underweight countries in the composition of the portfolio when they have a favourable 
view of a particular country. In annex 1, we give an example of the research publication’s 
recommendations given by one of the largest investment banks present in Latin America  
 
 
Table 1 
INVESTMENT BANKS' RECOMMENDATIONS DATABASE. NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS (July 1997- March 2006)
ABN BARCLY CITI CSFB DB GS JPM LB ML MS TOTAL
Argentina 14 4 69 56 50 24 59 19 18 26 339
Brazil 11 14 73 58 50 25 58 19 27 25 360
Chile 11 14 78 58 0 25 55 19 0 0 260
Colombia 11 15 77 58 50 25 59 19 26 25 365
Dom. Rep. 0 0 9 0 0 2 42 0 27 15 95
Ecuador 1 15 76 58 50 25 59 19 27 24 354
Mexico 11 15 78 58 50 25 59 19 27 24 366
Panama 0 14 61 58 49 25 58 0 27 24 316
Peru 1 14 78 58 50 25 59 19 27 24 355
Uruguay 0 0 21 57 0 16 52 19 27 0 192
Venezuela 11 13 81 58 50 25 59 19 27 24 367
TOTAL 71 118 701 577 399 242 619 171 260 211 3369
Part. Underwriting 2% 2% 12% 7% 10% 10% 22% 0% 6% 13% 84%
Source: The authors from investment banks' publications (for recommendations) and Bloomberg (for underwriting), april 2006  
 
 
 
In order to compare these recommendations with one of the most important 
businesses of investment banks in emerging countries, we have constructed a database 
that contains the Latin American Sovereign Bond Issues from January 1999 to March 
2006. The source of information was Bloomberg which, among other things, includes the 
lead managers (or underwriters), the amount outstanding, and the issue and maturity date 
of each issue. The most important reason for choosing Bloomberg as a source of 
information is that their database is one of the most important benchmarks for market-
makers in relation to the list of leaders in the underwriting business. Indeed, the “League 
Table” calculated yearly and from 1999 by Bloomberg represents an important guide for 
investors, issuers and actors about the reputation (measured as the market share) of each 
investment bank15. In order to define the issues that can be included in this “League 
Table”, Bloomberg has specified the characteristics of these issues.  
 
                                                 
15 See Bloomberg Markets (2006) for a detail of the relevance for the market of the information provided in that database.  
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As shown in table 2, the data used is composed by 411 underwriters and 
corresponds to 250 sovereign issues.16 In particular, almost 75% of the underwriters are 
located in Brazil, Argentina, Colombia and Mexico. More interesting is that Argentina, in 
1999, had to use 60% of the underwriters presented that year in Latin America in order to 
place a huge number of bonds, which in fact complicated even more the resolution of the 
Argentinean crisis.  In 1999 alone, Argentina issued a total of 52 bonds, compared with 
17 for Brazil and 8 for Mexico. The most active issuer in our sample over the period 
studied is also the largest economy of the region, namely Brazil, which happens to be 
also the most liquid Latin American market. 
 
Table 2 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 march TOTAL
Argentina 52 21 5 78
Brazil 17 21 12 8 8 12 18 6 102
Chile 2 2 5 2 2 13
Colombia 5 12 24 4 5 5 9 64
Dom. Rep. 2 2 2 6
Ecuador 2 2
Mexico 8 7 8 6 12 9 5 2 57
Panama 2 2 3 2 1 3 2 15
Peru 4 4 2 5 15
Uruguay 1 4 10 2 6 4 27
Venezuela 2 10 4 7 9 32
TOTAL 87 69 76 31 38 40 56 14 411
Source: The authors from Bloomberg, april 2006
Number of Lead Managers (Latin American Soverreign Bonds Issues). 
 
 
 
With the purpose of studying the size of the bond market for each Latin American 
Country, we took the weight of each country in the JP Morgan Emerging Markets Bond 
Index Global (EMBI Global). This index is a reference of the bonds stock for market-
makers, financial researchers and policy makers, which are, for each country, placed in 
the secondary market.  
 
The countries that are included in that index have been - during two consecutive 
years - low/middle income countries (as defined by the World Bank). Concerning the 
characteristics of the securities, only bonds that have an issue size higher than US$500 
millions and a maturity of at least 2.5 years are incorporated in that index17. As it is noted 
by JP Morgan Securities (2004), “the weight of each instrument in the EMBI Global is 
determined by dividing the issue’s market capitalization by the total market capitalization 
for instruments in the index.” Therefore “country weights for the EMBI Global are easily 
calculated by aggregating the weights of the instruments for each country”.    
 
                                                 
16 Indeed, the number of Lead Managers used today for most of the Latin American Emerging Bond Issues is two.  
17 For a more detailed description of the construction of that index, see JP Morgan Securities (2004).  
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In figure 1 we have the market weight of the three principal Latin American 
countries that compose that index today. Brazil and Mexico are by far the largest Latin 
American Bond Issuers (nearly 35% of the total index). Indeed, they represent more than 
60% of the Latin American Weight of that Index. Argentina nearly disappeared after 
2001 and its massive default but one year before it was still a major heavyweight, 
representing nearly a quarter of the total index. 
 
 
Figure 1 
EMBI  Global
(Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela)
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To calculate the perception of investors towards country credit risk, we have 
employed the spread of the EMBI Global which is measured as the credit risk premium 
over US Treasury Bonds and it is calculated as the difference between the yield to 
maturity bond and the yield to maturity of the corresponding point on the US treasury 
spot curve. For the country weights and the spreads we had information on a monthly 
basis from 1997 until today for the most important bond issuers in the region. In contrast, 
for Chile, Dominican Republic and Uruguay the period starts in June 1999, October 2001 
and June 2001 respectively.  
 
With the aim of studying the impact of investment banks’ recommendations on 
capital flows, we have used the database created by the Boston based private consulting 
firm Emerging Portfolio Fund Research which is constituted by the percentage allocated 
in each emerging country by funds.18 We then possess information on the country 
average weightings of all funds that invest in Latin American Equity and Bond Markets. 
The most important advantage of this database is that it contains information on a 
monthly basis about what differs with respect to other databases, such as the CPIS 
(Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey sponsored by the IMF)19 that includes portfolio 
investment assets on an annual basis and is produced by multilateral organizations (IMF, 
BIS, OECD and WB). 
                                                 
18 See http://www.emergingportfolio.com for a detailed description of that database.  
19 For more information about this database see http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/cpis.htm 
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Concerning equity flows, the period that we have used starts in July 1997 and 
ends in January 2006 for most of the Latin American countries of our sample20. In 
contrast, the bond flows database is constituted only from April 2002 and ends also in 
January 200621. 
  
In order to test the impact of investments banks’ recommendations on capital 
(bond and equity) flows, we have used some macroeconomic variables as control 
variables. These variables are on a monthly basis and are economic activity growth, 
inflation rate, exchange rate, interest rate and the spread of the EMBI Global. The sources 
of information of these variables are Bloomberg and Financial Thomson Datastream, and 
cover the period June 1997 – January 2006.     
 
For the case of economic activity growth, for some countries (e.g. Brazil and 
Colombia), given there is no monthly indicator of economic activity, we have taken as 
proxy industrial production due to the strong relationship between this variable and GDP. 
For the case of Venezuela, given the lack of a robust monthly indicator we have 
transformed GDP (that is calculated on a quarterly basis) on a monthly basis. For that, we 
have used Boot, Feibes, and Lisman (1967) methodology that consist of minimizing the 
sum of squares of the second differences. Concerning the other macroeconomic variables 
we have used the most relevant indicator for each country22. 
 
 
4. Investment banks’ business and research publications 
 
In this section we present some empirical evidence of the relationship between 
investment banks’ recommendations and some aspects related to the business of these 
banks (in particular sell-side business). This section gives some preliminary results in 
order to understand whether banks’ advice to investors is biased. For that, we first 
analyzed the recommendations given by underwriters during the announcement date of 
an IPO. Secondly, we studied the possible impact that the market size of an emerging 
country could have on the recommendation given by banks.   
 
 
4.1 Underwriters’ recommendations: a simple statistical analysis 
 
With the aim of investigating possible incentives that investment banks could 
have to concede a favourable recommendation to a specific emerging country, we have 
studied the behaviour of investment banks during sovereign bond issues. More 
specifically, we have integrated underwriters of the Latin American bonds issues with 
their recommendations, in order to analyze their recommendations in an IPO.  
                                                 
20 For Ecuador and Panama, we have information only from February 2005 and for Dominican Republic and Uruguay there is no 
information for equity flows.   
21 For Dominican Republic the information provided for bond flows only starts in July 2004.   
22 For the case of interest rate, for instance, for Argentina we have used Prime rate 30 dias, For Brazil Selic rate, for Chile Tasa de 
Politica Monetaria, for Colombia DTF, for Mexico Cetes 28 dias, for Peru Interbank Interest Rate  for Venezuela TAN.  
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Our database is composed of 160 underwriters’ recommendations during 
approximately seven years (July 1999- March 2006). By giving the value of 1 to 
overweight recommendations (buy advices), 0 to neutral recommendations (maintain the 
same percentage of an asset in the portfolio) and -1 to underweight recommendations 
(sell advices), we have constructed a database that allows us to give a first simple result 
on whether investment banks’ recommendations are biased and therefore dependent on 
the IPOs business. As we have noted before, given portfolio restrictions, these 
recommendations can not be overweight for all countries; a favourable recommendation 
for one country has to be compensated with a pessimistic view of another country.        
 
Table 3 
Underwriters' recommendations (Announcement date of the issue)
Jan. 1999 - March 2006
OVER. NEUTRAL UNDER. OBSERV.
Argentina 0% 67% 33% 9
Brazil 59% 41% 0% 37
Chile 20% 60% 20% 5
Colombia 35% 65% 0% 31
Dom. Rep. 0% 100% 0% 2
Ecuador 50% 50% 0% 2
Mexico 29% 55% 16% 31
Panama 0% 71% 29% 14
Peru 46% 38% 15% 13
Uruguay 0% 100% 0% 1
Venezuela 67% 27% 7% 15
TOTAL 38% 52% 10% 160
Source: The authors from Investment Banks' recommendations 
and Bloomberg, april 2006  
 
 
In table 3, we present the recommendations given by banks that have been 
underwriters for Latin American sovereign bond issues. The most important and relevant 
result is that 90% (i.e. 144 of 160) of the underwriters recommend, at the announcement 
date of the issue, to buy or to maintain in their portfolio the bonds issued by the countries 
where they are acting as lead managers. Indeed, given that only 10% of the 
recommendations are negative, we could note that banks’ recommendations are biased 
and depend on the underwriting process in which banks are involved.  
 
By analyzing each Latin American country, all of them (except Argentina and 
Panama) have a higher percentage of optimistic underwriters’ recommendations than 
pessimistic recommendations.   
 
The Argentinean case is very useful and interesting. All the issues that we have 
included were previous to the 2001 Argentinean Default and some of them just a few 
months before the crisis. It is worth pointing out that even if we have not noted an 
overweight recommendation, 67% of the recommendations were to maintain the 
positions in Argentinean External Debt, even in the months previous to the default. 
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Indeed, some of the comments given by banks months before the crisis were, at least, 
unrealistic and biased, given that macroeconomic perspective was unsustainable 23. 
 
By analyzing the first three countries where we have the higher number of 
observations (Brazil, Colombia and Mexico) or underwriters’ recommendations, we note 
that for all of them, underwriters have, in most cases, a positive view about the country 
(100% for Colombia and Brazil, and 84% for Mexico). By analyzing underweight 
recommendations, Brazil and Colombia have never obtained a pessimistic view from 
brokers (even though Colombia once lost its investment grade), and in Mexico less than 2 
out of 10 recommendations were pessimistic. Therefore, it is clear from empirical 
evidence that during the last years banks’ recommendations were favourable in regard to 
the country for which they acted as underwriters.    
 
What is the incentive for underwriters to give a favourable recommendation at the 
announcement date of an issue? Firstly, positive recommendations could have an impact 
on the success of the “book-building” process in which underwriters are designated to 
place the bonds through institutional investors. If your view is positive or at least neutral 
of the country, your likelihood of getting the mandate will probably increase. The 
refutation of this hypothesis would be that brokers recommending to sell a sovereign 
could get an underwriting mandate. 
 
Secondly, because one of the roles of underwriters is to participate in the 
secondary market to stabilize the price and avoid volatility of the new issue24, by giving 
favourable advice to investors regarding external debt issued, underwriters could send 
positive signals about that country and then avoid a decrease in the price25.  
 
In order to prove that underwriters’ recommendations are biased and depend on 
the sell side business of investment banks, we have compared these recommendations 
with recommendations given by other investment banks during the announcement date of 
the issue of a bond.  
 
                                                 
23 Here we impart some of the biased views concerning the Argentinean Crisis. Credit Suisse First Boston:   
“Argentina. Remain market-weight. We believe the expected debt exchange will be a key driver of Argentine asset prices during the 
month”…. “Over the next month we expect to see many more specifics of the economic program, both on the fiscal side – to be 
released in the IMF Letter of Intent – as well as on the deregulation front, which should reduce uncertainty.” CSFB May 2001 and 
“The successful debt exchange in Argentina should give the market some stability in the near-term horizon, which should be most 
beneficial to Brazil.”  CSFB June 2001. Salomon Smith Barney: “The successful implementation of the IMF support package — with 
the associated debt management transactions — and the change in the global outlook probably increases the chances that economic 
activity will pick up in the second half of the year. We therefore recommend a neutral position in external bonds and local currency 
instruments.” Salomon Smith Barney January 17, 2001 JPMorgan: “Argentina: Marketweight. Favorable technicals underpin our 
portfolio allocation this month. .” JP Morgan 5 April 2001 and “Argentina: Marketweight. The improved near-term outlook appears 
mostly priced in, although we like the short end of the curve from a relative value perspective.” JP Morgan 8 February 2001. Morgan 
Stanley: “We are maintaining our Market Perform recommendation on Argentine bonds….Relaxation of fiscal targets and an 
innovative IMF-led financial package from creditors both improve Argentina’s credit outlook. Argentina needs to raise an estimated 
$2.6 billion to fulfil its first quarter financing requirements. New issues are expected to total $5.6 billion in 2001. Growth and fiscal 
performance are becoming the focus of investors’ attention.” Morgan Stanley January 26, 2001 
 
24 As it is noted on the prospectus of the bonds, although the underwriter is not obligated to make a secondary market for the bonds, it 
plans to make one: “The issuer has been advised by the underwriters that the underwriters intend to make a market in the global bonds 
but are not obligated to do so and may discontinue market making at any time without notice. No assurance can be given as to the 
liquidity of the trading market for the global bonds.” 
25 it would be interesting to analyse the impact of recommendations on the secondary market price of sovereign bonds. With respect to 
that subject, some important studies have been developed in the US equity market.   
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As shown in figure 2, on average (period 1999-2006), for all countries 
underwriters’ recommendations to Latin American countries are higher than or at least 
equal to no-underwriters’ recommendations. Additionally, by taking the weighted 
average, underwriters’ recommendations are 25% larger (0.3 vs. 0.2) with respect to 
those of No-Lead managers. This is particularly the case for Colombia, Ecuador, Peru 
and Venezuela. Interestingly, in the case of Brazil, the biggest and most liquid market, 
such a bias is less marked, while in the case of Mexico it is the opposite.  
 
Figure 2 
Underwriters vs No-Underwriters' recommendations 
(Announcement date, Average 1999-2006)
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Moreover, by comparing the recommendation made at the announcement date by 
underwriters and no-underwriters, we discovered that 75% of the lead managers’ advice 
was higher than or equal to that made by other investment banks during 1999-2006 and 
for a sample of 149 recommendations26. In particular, as we can see in table 4, for all 
countries excluding Panama, with respect to no-underwriters’ recommendations, the 
percentage of higher underwriters’ recommendations was superior to lower underwriters’ 
recommendations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 This sample is less than this one used for total recommendations (149 vs. 160) because in some bond issues (mostly at the beginning 
of the period) we obtained only the recommendation of the underwriter and not those of other investment banks.  
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Table 4 
Underwriters' recommendations vs.
Other investment banks' recommendations (1999-2006)
HIGHER EQUAL LOWER OBSERV.
Argentina 20% 80% 0% 5
Brazil 39% 33% 28% 36
Chile 20% 60% 20% 5
Colombia 28% 62% 10% 29
Dom. Rep. 0% 100% 0% 2
Ecuador 100% 0% 0% 2
Mexico 39% 29% 32% 28
Panama 8% 46% 46% 13
Peru 54% 8% 38% 13
Uruguay 100% 0% 0% 1
Venezuela 53% 27% 20% 15
TOTAL 36% 39% 25% 149
Source: The authors from Investment Banks' recommendations 
and Bloomberg, april 2006  
 
 
By analyzing the results showed in the precedent paragraphs we obtained two 
interesting findings. First, given that a large part of underwriters’ recommendations are 
positive, it suggests that they are biased and depend on the sell side business. Second, 
despite the fact that in most cases lead managers’ recommendations are higher than or 
equal to no-lead managers’ advice, this result is less evident than the first finding. 
Therefore there is a remaining question that is related to the incentive that no-
underwriters could have to give an equal or better recommendation than underwriters. 
For that we have analysed the structure of the underwriter in Latin America. 
   
In table 5 we present the participation of the underwriters in the Latin American 
Sovereign Bond Market. As noted before, the number of underwriters in the Sovereign 
Bond Market is small. Indeed, for most of the Latin American countries, during 1999-
2006, 90% of the issues are realized by 10 investment banks. However, from the point of 
view of governments, we observe a diversification in the choice of underwriters, which 
results in a change over time of the underwriters with the purpose of reducing the 
dependence to a single Lead Manager. In the major countries’ issuers (Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela), the market share of a lead manager does 
not exceed 30%, which corroborates that there is no specific leader in the underwriter 
market, at least for the most important countries’ issuers.  
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Table 5 
# Issues ABN BARCLY. C CSFB DB GS JPM ML MS UBS TOTAL
Argentina 53 1.0 1.4 7.7 9.9 17.3 6.2 19.2 2.3 17.6 0.0 82.7
Brazil 53 0.9 0.4 10.9 4.2 9.4 12.0 16.9 9.1 12.9 5.1 81.7
Chile 7 0.0 0.0 31.2 0.0 25.1 0.0 37.0 6.7 0.0 0.0 100.0
Colombia 41 4.1 0.0 15.0 12.3 4.0 14.4 20.0 12.7 12.5 1.3 96.3
Dom. Rep. 3 0.0 0.0 21.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 28.6 0.0 100.0
Ecuador 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
Mexico 35 0.0 6.0 9.9 5.7 4.9 15.7 30.1 1.0 13.5 4.1 90.9
Panama 11 0.0 0.0 39.9 0.0 5.0 3.5 16.9 0.0 34.6 0.0 100.0
Peru 10 0.0 0.0 24.0 4.8 13.5 0.0 41.8 4.8 3.8 7.2 100.0
Uruguay 18 1.4 0.0 19.2 6.9 18.6 0.0 13.3 11.9 7.8 16.0 95.2
Venezuela 17 20.6 3.4 2.9 20.6 14.0 0.0 14.9 3.4 0.0 9.7 89.5
Source: The authors from Bloomberg, April 2006
Participation (%) of the underwriters in Latin American Countries (Jan. 1999-March 2006)
 
 
Another way to arrive at a similar conclusion is by analyzing the concentration of 
the underwriting market (table 6). By calculating the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI)27 for each Latin American Country during 1999-2005 (see table 5), we obtained 
two important results. Firstly, despite the fact that the underwriting concentration in the 
Latin American Bond Market could be considered by the U.S. Department of Justice as 
highly concentrated28, given the reduced number of actors, the concentration index is not 
so elevated. Secondly, during the last seven years, we note that the concentration has 
remained stable (around 0.22) and we have seen neither an increase in the number of 
actors in this game nor an increase in the participation of a single underwriter. 
 
Table 6 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Argentina 0.14 0.14 0.34
Brazil 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.15 0.12
Chile 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.50
Colombia 0.28 0.27 0.11 0.25 0.39 0.54 0.19
Dom. Rep. 0.50 0.50
Ecuador 0.50
Mexico 0.24 0.29 0.33 0.18 0.26 0.14 0.21
Panama 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.68
Peru 0.38 0.36 0.53 0.22
Uruguay 1.00 0.53 0.14 0.53 0.31
Venezuela 0.50 0.50 0.41 0.20 0.28
Weighted Average 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.20 0.26 0.22 0.20
Source: The authors from Bloomberg, april 2006
Concentration (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) in the Underwriting Market 
 
                                                 
27 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a standard measure of concentration in Industrial Organization and is defined as: 
∑
=
=
N
i
ixHHI
1
2  where ix  is the participation rate of firm i in a market composed by N firms.   
28 The U.S. Department of Justice considers a market with a result of less than 0.1 to be a competitive marketplace; a result of 0.1-0.18 
to be a moderately concentrated marketplace; and a result of 1.8 or greater to be a highly concentrated marketplace. See 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/hhi.htm 
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Theoretically, then Emerging Sovereign Bond Markets are characterized by an 
imperfect competitive market in which underwriters are playing a repeated game. By 
taking investment banks’ recommendations as a marketing product, it is then 
advantageous to investment banks, given the dynamic of the “underwriting game”, to 
recommend positively a country (or client) even if at that period they have not been 
underwriters.  
 
Therefore, it is not sure that no-underwriters recommendations could be taken as a 
control variable to test if underwriters’ recommendations are biased. In fact, this may 
explain why the result showed in table 4 (underwriters’ vs. no-underwriters’ 
recommendations) is less robust than that obtained by analyzing the percentage of 
positive underwriters’ recommendations (table 3) to show that the recommendations are 
biased and depend on the Underwriting Market.    
 
 
4.2 Size of the emerging markets and recommendations: empirical evidence and 
implications 
 
In the last sub-section we have studied the relationship between investment 
banks’ recommendations and the process of bond issues in the primary market. Here we 
study the possible influence of the size of the secondary bond market on investment 
banks’ recommendations.   
 
Indeed, in addition to the underwriting process, part of investment banks’ 
business is also related to the bonds that have already been issued. Because one of the 
most important aspects for investment banks is the sale of portfolios to a large variety of 
financial intermediaries (mutual funds, pension funds, commercial banks, insurance 
companies,…), the stability asset prices that compose these portfolios is relevant. For that 
purpose, investment banks’ publications may be a useful tool to influence the asset 
prices.  
 
Concerning Emerging Bond Markets, it is evident that the percentage invested in 
these portfolios increases relative to the size of each emerging country. In order to 
calculate the relative size of each Latin American country in the Emerging Bond Markets, 
we have used the weight of each country in the EMBI-Global (Emerging Market Bond 
Index) that can be used as the magnitude in the Secondary Bond Market of each Latin 
American country.  
 
The weight of each emerging country in this database is similar to that obtained in 
other databases. For example, by comparing the EMBI-Global with the Joint External 
Debt Hub (JEDH) database29 which provides the stock of international debt securities, we 
get a high correlation between both weights for the Latin American Emerging Countries 
(0.70 and 0.98 by excluding Argentina). 
                                                 
29 This database is jointly developed by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank (WB). See: 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/sdmx/jedh/jedh_dbase.html 
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In order to verify if investment banks’ recommendations are biased and depend on 
the size of the market of each emerging economy, we have compared the EMBI-Global 
weight of each Latin American country with the average of the total investment banks’ 
recommendations between July 1997 and March 2006. As shown in table 7, by realizing 
a simple cross-section analysis, we discovered that, excluding Argentina, there is a high 
correlation between investment banks’ recommendations and the size of the markets (0.8 
for 10 Latin American Countries).  
 
Table 7 
Average Recommendation EMBI-Global country weights EMBI-Global spreads
Argentina -0.19 11.4 2620
Brazil 0.35 19.4 795
Chile 0.05 1.0 142
Colombia 0.14 2.2 508
Dom. Rep. -0.01 0.3 686
Ecuador -0.04 1.3 1426
Mexico 0.33 16.8 349
Panama -0.03 1.9 384
Peru 0.05 1.7 497
Uruguay -0.32 0.6 634
Venezuela 0.11 5.2 822
Correlation with recomm. (with Argentina) 0.61 -0.40
Correlation with recomm. (without Argentina) 0.81 -0.14
Source: The authors, from Investment banks' publications and JP Morgan, april 2006
Recommendations vs. Credit Risk and Size of the Countries (Average 1997-2006)
  
 
Including Argentina the correlation is lower (0.6) because their size in the market 
was substantial (11.4%) vis-à-vis their recommendations (-0.19). In fact, if we compare 
the average of the recommendations for Argentina (1997-2006) with the present weight 
in the EMBI-Global (1.8% in March 2006), the correlation between both variables for the 
total of Latin American countries is 0.8 (see figure 3).  
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Figure 3 
Recommendations vs. Country weights EMBI Global 
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The main result then is that as the size of the market increases the 
recommendation is more favorable. That is the case of Brazil and Mexico, whose market 
share in the Emerging market is the highest for all the emerging countries (19.4% and 
16.8% respectively) and consequently their recommendations are the most elevated of 
our sample (0.35 and 0.33 respectively). By contrast, for countries which are less relevant 
in the Sovereign Bond Market, such as Dominican Republic or Uruguay (0.3% and 0.6% 
respectively of the total Emerging Bond Market), the recommendations are negative or at 
least neutral (-0.01 and -0.32).  
 
In order to test, in a simple way, the robustness of this result, we have analyzed 
the relationship between investment banks’ recommendations and credit risk30. 
Intuitively, if we assume that recommendations are unbiased and then objective, as credit 
risk is higher the recommendations would be more favorable. However, as is shown in 
table 7 column 3, we obtained that there is no correlation between both variables (-0.14 
by excluding Argentina and -0.4 by including Argentina).  
 
An interesting case is that of Chile, that it is well known today as an exceptional 
country from the point of view of macroeconomic soundness and stability.  During the 
period that we have studied, the spread of the Chilean Bonds were on average 142 basis 
points over Treasury Bills, the lowest of Latin American countries. By contrast, their 
recommendations were below those of Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela and 
close to neutral (0.05).    
 
By using a simple statistical analysis, we have two main results in this sub-
section. First, investment banks’ recommendations are biased and depend on the relative 
size of the secondary bond market. By taking as analogy the famous term of “too big to 
fail” that refers to the case in which governments will bailout only financial 
intermediaries which are considered to be of “systematic” importance, we obtained a 
                                                 
30 In order to calculate country credit risk, we have taken the spread of the EMBI-Global (JP Morgan), that it is in fact a proxy of the 
perception of the market about country credit risk. 
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similar result but in a contrary direction and that we call “too big to underwrite”. Indeed, 
investment banks will not send negative signals to investors of countries or governments 
that are considered to be important for their business given their size in the market. 
Second, from this simple analysis, it seems that credit risk is not a relevant variable to 
determine the direction of the recommendations.   
 
 
5. Emerging markets capital flows and investment banks recommendations: 
preliminary results 
  
 In the last section, from a simple statistical analysis, we have concluded that 
investment banks’ recommendations are biased and depend on the business of these 
banks in emerging economies. Therefore, it is crucial to analyze the possible impact that 
these recommendations could have on emerging economies. In other terms, a remaining 
aspect is the impact that asymmetric information and imperfect microeconomic factors 
could have on investors’ behaviour.  
 
 In order to answer this question we have studied the relationship between brokers’ 
recommendations and fund flows in the most important Latin American economies (i.e. 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela). More precisely, on a 
monthly basis, we have taken the average of the recommendations given by investment 
banks for each Latin American economy and the percentage allocated by funds in these 
countries with respect to the total amount invested in emerging economies. Indeed, we 
preferred to use weighted flows instead of nominal flows with the purpose of studying the 
discriminatory role of investors among countries.  
  
 A first simple statistical analysis was to calculate the correlation between fund 
flows and brokers’ recommendations. In the following figures (from figure 4 to figure 7) 
we showed, for instance, the case of Argentina and Brazil31. Concerning Bond flows, 
there is a positive and significant correlation with recommendations for both countries.  
By contrast, by analyzing Equity flows, for Argentina again there is a strong relationship 
with recommendations while for Brazil this partnership is less evident.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 As noted before, overweight recommendations take the value of 1, neutral outlook the value of 0 and 
underweight recommendations the value of -1. 
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Figure 6     Figure 7 
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In order to analyze the determinants of capital flows to Latin American emerging 
countries, we have realized a simple cross-section econometric model that uses, in 
addition to investment banks’ recommendations (that may be considered as a 
microeconomic variable), macroeconomic variables.  
 
These macroeconomic variables could de divided into two groups. First, we have 
taken variables whose trend can be directly influenced by financial intermediaries and are 
then defined by capital markets. These variables are the spread of Emerging Sovereign 
Bonds (over US treasury Bills) and the exchange rate. Second, we have used variables 
whose real sector is determinant to define their evolution and where financial 
intermediaries play an indirect role. These variables are economic activity, interest rate 
and inflation rate32. 
 
In order to test the impact of recommendations on capital flows (Equity flows and 
Bond flows respectively), we have used a panel data model that presents the following 
two basic equations: 
                                                 
32 See section three for a description of the variables taken for each country.  
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ititititit alMarketcEquity εγδβα +⋅+⋅+⋅+= ReRe   (i) 
 
 
ititititit alMarketcBond εγδβα +⋅+⋅+⋅+= ReRe   (ii) 
 
 where Recit represents investment banks’ recommendations given to country i in period t, 
Marketit represents macroeconomic variables defined by capital markets (exchange rate and 
spread of sovereign Bonds) and Realit macroeconomic variables that are strongly influenced by 
real sector (economic activity, inflation rate and interest rate).  
  
 We started the estimation technique with the current practice, OLS estimation. 
Since these are known to deal inadequately with time series and cross-section 
heterogeneity, we reported also GLS estimates (random effects on countries).  
 
 Concerning Equity flows, results are presented in tables A1 and A2 and for Bond 
flows results are reported in tables B1 and B2. The results for Equity and Bond flows are 
too similar and can be summarized as follows.  
 
By using OLS estimation, we find, as we would expect, a positive and significant 
effect of Rec and a negative and significant effect of exchange rate depreciation and 
spreads of bonds. Concerning Real variables, only economic activity has the expected 
sign but all of them are significant. By differentiating between Market and Rec variables 
with Real variables, the most important and relevant results are first that Real variables 
do not have a prediction capability to explain capital flows. Second, by analyzing only 
Market variables the prediction capacity is higher than using only Real variables. Finally, 
the impact of Rec on capital flows is important and increases the R-squared of the 
regressions. Indeed, Rec explains better capital flows than Real variables.  
  
 A second step of this analysis was to calculate the impact of lag explanatory 
variables on capital flows. We find the same results noted above. In particular, by 
analyzing only Market and Rec variables we obtain that they have a prediction capacity 
higher than Real variables. In addition, by associating first exchange rate and Rec and 
then by connecting exchange rate and spread we find that the first case has a higher R-
squared.   
  
 By realizing a GLS estimation (random effects on countries), we have obtained 
the same results presented above. In summary, we find that variables that are determined 
by financial intermediaries (Rec and Market) play a crucial role to explain capital flows. 
In particular, by including Rec in the analysis, the results are more robust than before and 
the explanatory capacity of this variable is then more important than Real variables.  
 
In conclusion, investment banks’ recommendation is a determinant variable to 
explain capital flows. In particular, for most of the results shown in tables A1, A2, B1 
and B2, we find that by including this new microeconomic variable, among 
macroeconomic variables, the robustness of the regressions improves considerably.  
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6. Conclusions  
 
In order to analyze analysts and to determine the possible macroeconomic 
implications of investment banks’ recommendations we have constructed a unique 
database covering the period 1997-2006 for all the bond recommendations by the major 
Wall Street and City investment banks that dominate the emerging bond markets. Indeed, 
we managed to build the database for 10 brokers, all of them dominant players in 
emerging bond markets as underwriters. All of them are from developed countries’ 
brokerage houses, which are in fact the market makers.  
 
In order to investigate if investments banks’ recommendations are biased and are 
related to the banks’ business we have first studied the structure of the primary bond 
market in Latin American countries and second the stock of bonds already issued by 
these countries and placed in the secondary market.  
 
The most relevant results of that study are first that 90% of the underwriters 
recommend, at the announcement date of the issue, to buy or to maintain in their portfolio 
the bonds issued by the countries where they are acting as lead managers. Indeed, given 
that only 10% of the recommendations are negative, we could note that banks’ 
recommendations are biased and depend on the underwriting process in which banks are 
involved.  
 
Second, there is an additional bias. Investment banks’ recommendations are 
biased and depend on the relative size of the secondary bond market, phenomenon that 
we call “too big to underwrite”. Indeed, investment banks will not send negative signals 
to investors of countries or governments that are considered to be important for their 
business given their size in the market (e.g., Brazil and Mexico vs. Chile). Therefore, it 
seems that credit risk is not a relevant variable to determine the direction of the 
recommendations.   
 
Given that these results reveal that signals sent by investments banks’ to investors 
are imperfect and biased, we have studied a possible effect of these recommendations on 
emerging economies.  
 
To that purpose, by using a simple cross-section analysis, we introduced 
recommendations as a new variable that could explain capital flows towards emerging 
economies. The most important result is that the impact of investment banks’ 
recommendations on capital flows is more significant and more predictable than some 
macroeconomic variables such as interest rates, economic growth and inflation.       
 
In summary, investment banks’ recommendations are a biased microeconomic 
variable that explain, among other variables, capital movements and then could affect 
emerging economies’ business cycles. It seems then that this new database is a useful and 
powerful tool to understand banks’ and investors’ behaviour. Therefore, it could be used 
for further research, for example, to ascertain the impact that electoral years could have 
on these recommendations.  
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TABLE A1 
Dependent variable: Equity 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Rec 2.33 2.27
9.95 8.91
Exchange Rate (Market ) -0.005 -0.003 -0.003
-16.84 -15.45 -15.97
Spread (Market ) -0.0012 -0.0092 -0.0007
-10.8 -7.66 -5.83
Inflation rate (Real ) 0.05 -0.032
8.81 -8.75
Economic Activity (Real ) 0.104 0.07
4.68 2.6
Interest rate (Real ) 0.11 0.062
9.19 4.41
Rec -1 2.37 2.58 2.31
10.17 10.39 9.09
Exchange Rate -1 (Market ) -0.005 -0.003 -0.025 -0.00267
-16.91 -15.33 -14.96 -15.89
Spread -1 (Market ) -0.001 -0.0009 -0.0006
-10.82 -7.59 -5.72
Inflation rate -1 (Real ) 0.516 -0.03
8.93 -8.68
Economic Activity -1 (Real ) 0.108 0.077
4.9 2.86
Interest rate -1 (Real ) 0.116 0.064
9.35 4.53
Cons 3.76 3.18 5.82 5.22 3.7 3.12 5.8 4.46 5.18
14.76 10.23 27.33 25.04 14.6 10.03 27.11 26.27 24.82
N 657 714 698 660 650 707 691 671 653
N-k 650 710 695 656 643 703 688 668 649
Adjusted R-squared 0.47 0.12 0.28 0.35 0.48 0.11 0.27 0.31 0.35
t- statistics are in italic
OLS
Impact of Recommendations on Equity Flows: OLS and Random Effects
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TABLE A2 
Dependent variable: Equity 
I II III IV
Rec 2.33 0.612
9.95 6.19
Exchange Rate (Market ) -0.005 -0.0004 -0.0008
-16.84 -2.44 -4.35
Spread (Market ) -0.0012 -0.0004 -0.0004
-10.8 -7.92 -6.82
Inflation rate (Real ) 0.05 -0.0056
8.81 -1.14
Economic Activity (Real ) 0.104 0.0216
4.68 2.37
Interest rate (Real ) 0.11 0.018
9.19 2.98
Cons 3.76 3.27 4.01 4.05
14.76 1.86 2.32 7.99
N 657 714 698 660
N-k 650 710 695 656
Adjusted R-squared 0.48 0.11 0.18 0.33
t- statistics are in italic
Impact of Recommendations on Equity Flows: OLS and Random Effects
RE (GLS)
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TABLE B1 
Dependent variable: Bond 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Rec 5.48 5.2
11.18 9.21
Exchange Rate (Market ) -0.005 -0.002 -0.0025
-12.97 -7.2 -9.55
Spread (Market ) -0.00175 -0.001 -0.0007
-10.59 -5.95 -4.4
Inflation rate (Real ) 0.0614 -0.022
7.51 -3.51
Economic Activity (Real ) 0.14 0.043
3.78 0.87
Interest rate (Real ) 0.2162 0.0627
9.74 2.4
Rec -1 5.4 5.14
10.94 9.1
Exchange Rate -1 (Market ) -0.005 -0.02 -0.002
-12.71 -7.18 -9.36
Spread -1 (Market ) -0.0016 -0.001 -0.0007
-10.1 -5.84 -4.15
Inflation rate -1 (Real ) 0.06 -0.02
7.46 -3.47
Economic Activity -1 (Real ) 0.13 0.053
3.71 1.08
Interest rate -1 (Real ) 0.2 0.06
9.39 2.34
Cons 6.49 5.96 8.92 8.28 6.54 5.94 8.91 8.25
15.71 10.21 20.86 21.42 15.73 10.26 20.73 21.12
N 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322
N-k 315 318 319 318 315 318 319 318
Adjusted R-squared 0.53 0.04 0.18 0.35 0.53 0.05 0.17 0.34
t- statistics are in italic
Impact of Recommendations on Bond Flows: OLS and Random Effects
OLS
 
